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THE ETHEREAL SCHOLAR: DOES CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES HAVE WHAT MINORITIES WANT?
Richard Delgado*
Introduction
What does Critical Legal Studies (CLS) have to offer racial
minorities in their quest for social justice? More generally, what
legal theory or program best meets the needs and desires of
minorities? Any acceptable theory must be radical, or at any
rate progressive, one would think, since minorities want to
change the world. Although CLS purports to be a radical the-
ory,' minorities have not flocked to it. And CLS has not paid
much attention to minorities, not placing racial questions on its
agenda until this year, ten years after its formation as a legal
movement.
2
This article suggests that the current schism between CLS
and minorities results from a fundamental difference between
what CLS proposes and what minorities seek in a legal theory.
Part I describes what may be called the negative and positive
aspects of the CLS program, and explains why they are trou-
blesome for minorities. Part II reveals how a common theme of
the CLS critique-the advocacy of informality-ignores the
need for structure in containing and eliminating racism. The last
section of the article describes what a radical political program
must include to serve the interests of minorities, and outlines
the social arrangements that could best provide the safe and
decent conditions necessary for minorities to flourish.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. J.D., University of California,
Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1974.
'See, e.g., Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars:
The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 199-202
(1984); Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Strug-
gle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509,
509-10 (1984).
2 Approximately 40 minority lawyers, law students and law professors, out of a
total of approximately 150 people, attended the 1987 annual meeting of the Conference
on Critical Legal Studies. (The minority attendance at previous meetings has been much
smaller.) The topic of the 1987 annual meeting was race. The program was entitled "The
Sounds of Silence: Racism and the Law."
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I. CLS Themes-From a Minority Perspective
The CLS program has both negative and positive features.
The negative themes include a far-ranging attack on American
legal and social institutions, 3 while the positive themes describe
an alternative, utopian society.4 What follows is an analysis of
those elements of the CLS negative and positive programs that
minorities find unappealing and worrisome.
A. The CLS Negative Program
I admit at the outset that the CLS negative program con-
tains much that is useful for minorities. Its attack on the public/
private distinction breaks down the artificial barrier between the
public sphere, in which conduct is highly regulated, and the
private sphere, in which it is not.5 The CLS critique of the social
order demonstrates that current arrangements and distributions
of power are neither necessary nor natural, 6 and that hierarchy
irrationally places some at the top while it sacrifices those at
the bottom.7 More generally, CLS challenges and decodes "Eu-
3 Among the targets of~the CLS program are legal education, the bar, legal reason-
ing, rights (including civil rights), precedent, doctrine, hierarchy, meritocracy, the pre-
vailing liberal political vision, and conventional views of labor and the free market. See,
e.g., Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57 (1984); Hutchinson &
Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1477 (1984);
Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 332 (1986). See generally Bros-
nan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259 (1986). Admittedly, this article
contains a number of generalizations about a body of literature which has more than
one strand of thought. Although the description herein may not apply equally to all
Critical Legal Scholars, common themes do appear, and I feel I have fairly summarized
the field.
4 See hfra notes 72-83 and accompanying text; Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1983); R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975).
See, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980);
Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 140, 163-
65 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Kairys, Introduction, in id. at 1, 3; Sparer, supra note 1, at
529-31.
6 See, e.g., Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in The Politics
of Law: A Progressive Critique, supra note 5, at 40, 50; Mensch, The History of
Mainstream Legal Thought, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, supra note
5, at 18.
7 See Kennedy, supra note 6; see also D. Kennedy, Legal Education and the
Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983); Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1978) (attacking workplace hierarchies and judicial support
thereof).
1987] Minority Critique of CLS: The Ethereal Scholar 303
romyths" that rule the lives of minorities and consign us to
lowly fates."
At the same time, however, the CLS negative program
contains elements that repel and in fact threaten minorities.
These elements include: (i) disparagement of legal rules and
rights, 9 (ii) rejection of piecemeal change, 10 (iii) idealism,' and
(iv) use of the concept of false consciousness. 12 Much of CLS
scholarship in these areas is either risky, since it asks minorities
to give up something of value, or unreliable, because it is based
on presuppositions that do not correspond to our experience.13
1. The CLS Critique of Legal Rules and Rights
The CLS critique of legal rules and reasoning is well known.
Rules, since they are indeterminate and manipulable, can gen-
erate practically any result in a given situation.' 4 Rules invite
the savvy to operate near their borders while the uninitiated
remain well inside.15
Rights, a special kind of rule, receive particularly harsh
criticism from Critical Legal Scholars (Crits).16 Rights legitimize
society's unfair power arrangements, acting like pressure valves
8 See Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical
Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, Inequal. & the L. J. (forthcoming in 1987) (attacking
the Euromyths that whites rule by manifest destiny, being culturally and intellectually
superior to third world persons, and that minorities must become westernized in order
to gain power and control over their lives).
9 See infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
13 Moreover, the CLS movement may be reaching out to women and minorities
now, see supra note 2 and accompanying text, in part because it is under attack by the
right and needs allies. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. Coalition-building may
thus serve the temporary interest of all of these groups. See Bell, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980).
14 See, e.g., Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 1276, 1292 (1984); Kennedy, supra note 6, at 48-49; Kennedy, Form & Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1766-74 (1976); Trubek, Max
Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 720, 748-49 (1972).
5 See Kennedy, Form & Substance in Private Law Adjudication, supra note 14.
16 See generally Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984).
Among the CLS writers who criticize reliance on rights are: Freeman, Legitimating
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 3,
at 1482-83; Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective
Bargaining Law, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 450, 468-80 (1981); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights,
62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984).
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to allow only so much injustice.17 With much fanfare, the pow-
erful periodically distribute rights as proof that the system is
fair and just, and then quietly deny rights through narrow con-
struction, nonenforcement, or delay.'8
Rights, Crits argue, are never promulgated in genuinely
important areas such as economic justice. '9 They protect only
ephemeral things, like the right to speak or worship. 20 When
even these rights become threatening, they are limited.2'
For CLS, rights reinforce a soulless, alienating vision of
society made up of atomized individuals whose only concern is
to protect their own security and property.2 2 Crits argue that
rights are alienating since they force one to look at oneself and
others as isolated rights-bearers ("I got my rights") rather than
as interdependent members of a community, and make it im-
possible for us even to imagine what a nonhierarchical society
founded on cooperation and love would be like.
The CLS critique of rights and rules is the most problematic
aspect of the CLS program, and provides few answers for mi-
nority scholars and lawyers.2 3 We know, from frequent and sad
experience, that the mere announcement of a legal right means
little. We live in the gap between law on the books and law in
action. We have no difficulty imagining a better world; for us,
eliminating racism would be a good start.
'7 See, e.g., Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in The Politics
of Law: A Progressive Critique, supra note 5, at 96, 112-14; Freeman, supra note 16;
Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspec-
tives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 Or. L. Rev. 157 (1982).
,1 Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 17.
9 E.g., Kennedy, supra note 6, at 49; Kairys, Freedom of Speech, supra note 5,
at 164.
10 See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 48-49.
21 E.g., Kairys, Freedom of Speech, supra note 5, at 164-65 (freedom of expression
is limited when it becomes powerful enough to be threatening, as in the "fighting words"
or "clear and present danger" cases).
22 See Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique, supra note 5, at 281, 287; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 49; Tushnet,
supra note 16, at 1384. But see Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1, 65-68 (1984) (describing rights-like features of proposed Crit
society); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, supra note 4, at 597 (drawing
distinction between property rights, which tend to make some individuals dependent on
others, and political/civil rights, which do not pose this threat).
23 See, e.g., Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 000 (1987); Williams, supra note 8; G.
Torres, Address at Conference on Critical Legal Studies Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 1987)
(unpublished manuscript on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review).
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Even if rights and rights-talk paralyze us and induce a false
sense of security, as CLS scholars maintain, might they not
have a comparable effect on public officials, such as the police?
Rights do, at times, give pause to those who would otherwise
oppress us; without the law's sanction, these individuals would
be more likely to express racist sentiments on the job.24 It is
condescending and misguided to assume that the enervating
effect of rights talk is experienced by the victims and not the
perpetrators of racial mistreatment.
Second, CLS scholars are often hazy about what would
provide minorities comparable protection if rights no longer
existed.25 The CLS positive program, or Utopia, discussed be-
low, 26, is both far from adequate and far off in time.
Third, Crits argue that rights separate and alienate the in-
dividual from the rest of the human community.27 This may be
so for the hard-working Crits who spend much of their lives in
their studies and law offices. 28 For minorities, however, rights
serve as a rallying point and bring us closer together.29 On the
other hand, any distance rights place between us and others
may be beneficial; there is at least safety in distance. 30
One explanation for the CLS position on rights may be that
the average Crit, a white male teaching at a major law school,
24 See G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 472 (1954); Delgado, Words that Wound:
A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 133, 148-49 (1982); P. van den Berghe, Race and Racism 20-21 (2d ed. 1978) (law's
sanction has some effect in discouraging expression of racist sentiments).
2 See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (describing CLS' positive program);
Brosnan, supra note 3, at 264-67 (CLS' critiques of rights lack a theory of justice); id.
at 268 (describing CLS as politically passive).
26 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
27 See supra note 22; Sparer, supra note 1, at 529-30.
2 See Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 000 (1987) (describ-
ing critical scholars, typically white males who spend their lives in books, as being out
of touch with the minority experience).
29 See generally D. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 279-361 (2d ed. 1980)
(describing black movement and struggle for civil rights).
1o Compare Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buff. L.
Rev. 205, 217 (1979) (we need, but fear, community; observing that a single look from
a friend can reduce a victim to misery), with Abortion, Moral and Legal Perspectives
(J. Garfield & P. Hennessy, eds. 1985) (close--especially sexual-relationships with
men are risky and ill-advised because of power disparities between men and women
and the oppression of women in society). Minorities run comparable risks. See, e.g.,
Delgado, supra note 24 (minorities frequently subject to slights, rebuffs, and slurs); C.
Pierce, Unity in Diversity: Thirty-Three Years of Stress, Solomon Carter Fuller Lec-
tures, American Psychiatric Ass'n Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 12, 1986) (transcript
on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review) (blacks frequent victims
of "microaggressions"). See generally A. Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color (1978).
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has little use for rights.31 Those with whom he comes in contact
in his daily life-landlords, employers, public authorities-gen-
erally treat him with respect and deference. Rarely is he the
victim of coercion, revilement, or contempt. 32 In the mind of
the average Crit, rights offer relatively little security, while they
promote a shrunken, atrophied, and unsatisfying social exis-
tence.33 Rights transform those governed by them into lone,
deformed stick figures vulnerable to pressures emanating from
large corporations or faceless bureaucracies. 34 Yet, when Crits
are treated insensitively or unfairly, or are coerced into giving
up something of value-such as an academic appointment in a
tenure battle tinged by anti-Crit bias-they have been as quick
as anyone to resort to the language of rights. 35 Their behavior
in such situations exemplifies the universal tendency of belea-
guered persons and groups to revert to rights-talk.
For minorities, however, that rights minimize many forms
of coercion is of enormous importance. At the same time, the
psychic rewards that Crits believe will result from a rightless
interracial "community" are far from our experience. Even if
such rewards were achievable, they would necessarily rank
lower than simple security on our scale of need. Of course, a
utopian community of the sort Crits advocate might provide
minorities with both security and psychic satisfaction. As will
be shown later, however, that hope is probably ,vain.
3 6
In short, the two groups see rights differently. White CLS
members see rights as oppressive, alienating and mystifying.
For minorities, they are invigorating cloaks of safety that unite
31 See generally Williams, supra note 23 (describing differing attitudes of the author
and a white male colleague regarding an apartment lease in New York City); Dalton,
supra note 28; Gabel, The Phenomenology ofRights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984).
32 1 use "rarely" in a relative sense..See Delgado, supra note 24, at 135-49 (fre-
quency and severity of race-based harms greatest in minority populations).
3 See supra note 22.
3 These are the forms of mistreatment most white communitarians seem principally
concerned about. See, e.g., Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to
Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 34 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming
in 1987). See generally M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).
35 For example, when two Crits at an eastern law school were experiencing tenure
difficulty, allegedly because of their politics and innovative teaching, CLS members
around the country wrote to the university's president, urging him to investigate charges
that the law school's personnel procedures were biased and infringed the Crits' rights
of academic freedom.
36 See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (critique of the CLS positive
program).
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us in a common bond. Instead of coming to grips with the
different function of rights for the two groups, Crits insist that
minorities adopt their viewpoint, labeling disagreement on our
part false consciousness 37 or a lack of political sophistication.
2. The CLS Critique of Piecemeal Reform
Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incre-
mental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale
reformation that must occur to create a decent society.38 Even
worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal
reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. 39 Those who con-
trol the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional
concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or
worker as evidence that the system is fair and just.40 In fact,
Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case
method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incre-
mentalism and thereby maintaining the current power struc-
ture. 41 To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to aban-
don the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and
order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political
fashion.
42
The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperi-
alistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that
occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at
hand. 43 The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and
other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events af-
fecting them.44 A court order directing a housing authority to
37 For an explanation of the term "false consciousness," see infra notes 52-63 and
accompanying text. See also Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 Res. in L. &
Soc. 25, 25-27 (1980) (defining false consciousness as reification).
38 See Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 413, 421-23 (1984). See generally Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J.
1063 (1981).
39 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 286. See also Freeman, supra note 16; Kare,
supra note 7.
"0 See Freeman, supra note 16.
4' See Kennedy, supra note 6.
42 See D. Kennedy, supra note 7; Kennedy, supra note 6.
41 See, e.g., D. Bell, supra note 29, at 2-51; see also M. Jorrin, Governments of
Latin America 120 (1953) (citing slogan, "Hecha la ley, hecha la trampa"-every law
generates its own loophole).
See generally Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984).
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disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone
the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps
a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them
than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office.
It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revo-
lution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is
evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such
evidence.
Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary
changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small re-
forms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for
further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants' union
meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars' critique of
piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects
the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be
what we want.
3. CLS' Idealism
The CLS program is also idealistic. 45 CLS scholars' ideal-
ism transforms social reality into a mental construct. 46 Facts
become intelligible only through the categories of thought that
we bring to experience. Crits argue that the principal impedi-
ments to achieving an ideal society are intellectual. People are
imprisoned by a destructive system of mental categories that
blocks any vision of a better world. 47 Liberal-capitalist ideology
so shackles individuals that they willingly accept a truncated
existence and believe it to be the best available. Changing the
world requires primarily that we begin to think about it differ-
ently.48 To help break the mental chains and clear the way for
the creation of a new and better world, Crits practice "trash-
ing"-a process by which law and social structures are shown
4S I use the word "idealism" in its philosophic sense, whereby explanations of social
reality are in the realm of thought or consciousness, rather than in material forces or
concrete actions. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 707 (J.
Stein ed. 1971) (definition 5a of "idealism").
4 See Schwartz, supra note 38, at 422, 426-28; Gordon, supra note 22, at 291.
47 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 288-89; Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the
Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 671-72 (1981); Kennedy, Antonio
Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 A.L.S.A. Forum 32 (1982); Kennedy, Critical Labor
Law: A Comment, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 503, 506 (1981).
11 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 291 (individuals' principal limitations are their own
imagination and thought, but article concedes that, for example, "propensities for evil"
and "finite resources" might also play some part in limiting life possibilities of the poor).
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to be contingent, inconsistent and irrationally supportive of the
status quo without good reason.
4 9
CLS scholars' idealism has a familiar ring to minority ears.
We cannot help but be reminded of those fundamentalist preach-
ers who have assured us that our lot will only improve once we
"see the light" and are "saved."
Are our chains really mental? They may be so for members
of privileged groups. They are much less so for minorities.
Imagine that the Crits' trashing program succeeded and that all
laws were repealed. Would our lot improve? That proposition
is open to serious doubt. The forces that hold us back are not
largely mental, legal, nor even political. What holds us back is,
simply, racism-the myriad of insults, threats, indifference, and
other "microaggressions" to which we are continually exposed. 0
Because the Crits are intellectuals, they assign a large role
to reason and ideology. Yet reason and ideology do not explain
all evil. Telling an individual that he or she harbors racism will
not make it go away; telling a black person that a rebuff was
racially motivated will not ease its sting. Racism will not go
away simply because Crits show that legalisms are indetermi-
nate, that rights are alienating and legitimizing, and that law is
a reflection of the interests of the ruling class. Whatever utility
these concepts may have in other settings and in attempting to
explain the angst of CLS members, 5' they have limited appli-
cation in helping to understand, much less cure, racism.
4. The CLS Concept of False Consciousness
The concept of false consciousness is the final aspect of
Crit scholarship that minorities find problematic. 2 Workers and
49 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 289 (thinking one's way through the veil of
ideological mystification spun by the dominant culture); Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, supra note 5, at 11-17. See generally
Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1984).
50 See C. Pierce, supra note 30 (describing microaggressions as those "subtle, minor,
stunning, automatic assaults... by which whites stress blacks unremittingly and keep
them on the defensive, as well as in a psychologically reduced condition"); Pettigrew,
New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 Rutgers L. Rev.
673, 687, 690 (1985).
51 Rights-based talk may 'distress white professionals who hunger for a more com-
munitarian, fulfilling lifestyle than is currently attainable within their professional lives
and social class.
5 See generally Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (1968); Freeman, supra
note 16; Kairys, Introduction, supra note 5; Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal
System, supra note 47.
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minorities buy into a system that degrades and oppresses them,
and vehemently defend that system with a kind of "false
honor. ' 53 These groups accept their own subordination because
they believe that the constitutional system protects their prop-
erty against takings by the state, and that it elevates their status
above that of the lowest class.5 4 Thus, oppressed people not
only accept the liberal ideology and the mental shackles de-
scribed in the preceding section, but also embrace it loyally and
reject the proffered assistance of revolutionaries.
Some CLS writers even argue that the Framers intended
false consciousness to exist. While extolling the virtues of free-
dom, the Framers set out to achieve ideological hegemony for
themselves and their class by providing for separate classes and
by protecting the property and prerogatives of employers and
slave owners. 55
False consciousness rationalizes the lowly status of work-
ers, women, minorities and other oppressed groups.5 6 According
to capitalist-liberal ideology, society consists of individuals who
express political preferences through voting and achieve eco-
nomic results through the marketplace. 7 The system is formally
fair; therefore, if one is poor, reviled, hungry, or out of work,
it is one's own fault.58 At the same time, the person who occu-
pies a position of power deserves it. In a meritocratic society,
the cream rises to the top. The duty of everyone else is to obey.
Ideologically achieved domination becomes a self-generat-
ing spiral. The masses are persuaded that they are of little merit.
Demoralized, they take little interest in elections or in the way
political and economic life is run.59 Thus, false consciousness
51 See Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 26-27, 33-34
(critique of illusory rights) (1984); Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36
Stan. L. Rev. 247, 255-56 (1984). See generally Kennedy, supra note 6 (hierarchy sets
up artificial and false sense of self); Kennedy, supra note 30 (structure of society made
possible by consciousness of society); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, supra note 14.
m See supra note 52.
55 Sparer, supra note 1, at 537. See D. Bell, supra note 29, at 16-29. Bell does not
subscribe to the Crits' theory of black subordination via false consciousness.
6 See Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L.
Rev. 379 (1983); see also supra note'52.
17 See Kairys, Freedom of Speech, supra note 5, at 164; cf. Johnson, supra note
53, at 255-56.
18 See Freeman, supra note 16, at 1075; Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 Telos
123, 134 (Summer, 1979).
59 See Pettigrew, supra note 50, at 674-75.
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blinds them to the alienation, lack of justice, conflict and un-
fairness inherent in political life.
Civil rights law is subject to particularly scathing criticism.
Crits argue that the purpose of civil rights is to reconcile mi-
norities to subordination by convincing us that the system is
fair; our lowly status is simply the result of our inferiority. 60 The
legal system protects society's investment in the subordination
of minorities by assuring everyone that the status quo is inevi-
table.61 It accomplishes this by doling out the occasional victory,
such as Brown v. Board of Education,62 and by ensuring that
most civil rights are formal, rather than substantive. 63
As with the other elements of the negative program, one
should begin by asking whether the concept of false conscious-
ness holds true for minorities. Much of what Crits criticize as
false consciousness evinces their distrust of liberal legalisms
and the elusive promises of court victories. Most of us have
already acquired this distrust; society has provided us with more
than adequate tutelage. 64 We know from Derrick Bel65 and from
personal experience not to place too much reliance on liberal
attorneys who say they know exactly what we want. We know,
indeed we live, the bogus public-private distinction. 6
Moreover, it is worth questioning the extent to which our
current subordination is caused by uncritical absorption of self-
defeating ideologies, as opposed to other forces. Much more of
our current plight is due to other factors: coercion by the dom-
inant group; exclusion from clubs, networks, information, and
needed help at crucial times; microaggressions; and the paralysis
and hopelessness caused by the majority culture's denial of our
pain and reality. (Who among us has not been asked by a white
60 See Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, supra note 47, at 8.
61 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
- 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63 See generally Freeman, supra note 16 (antidiscrimination laws actually perpetuate
discrimination through formality).
64 See supra notes 23, 43 and accompanying text; see generally Pettigrew, supra
note 50 (formal condemnation of racism by courts and legislators since 1964 has reduced
blatant, violent acts of racism, but other forms persist).
61 Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegration Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976) (conflicts of interest between minority
clients and their lawyers).
66 See Kairys, Freedom of Speech, supra note 5, at 163-164.
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person, naively or almost incredulously, "Do you really, in this
day and age, suffer on account of your race?" 67)
Ultimately, the CLS false-consciousness analysis raises
more questions than it answers. If false consciousness exists
and is so powerful, why are only minorities and workers afflicted
by it, and not white radicals? Is there not something patronizing
in diagnosing an intellectual disease that exclusively afflicts per-
sons of color?6 Is not "false consciousness" an expression, like
"incompetent" or "insane," that gives others the authority to
treat the victim as if he lacks humanity, autonomy, or will?69 Is
not false consciousness an excuse for white radicals to assert
and retain power they would otherwise have to explain and
justify? Does not the CLS program create its own false con-
sciousness within the law schools which employ CLS radicals,
and ultimately within society at large? Unless coupled with
practical action to storm trenches and organize workers, some-
thing CLS members have been remarkably slow to do, 70 the
CLS reform program allows society to validate myths about free
speech and the right to dissent.
71
B. The CLS Positive Program
Critical Legal Studies, to date, has devoted much less effort
to developing a positive program than to criticizing rules and
social structures. 72 In general, the Crits' positive aim is to es-
tablish a Utopia in which true community would prevail. 73 De-
67See Pettigrew, supra note 50, at 690-97 (many whites believe racial problem has
been solved, but continue to engage in subtle forms of racism).
0 Cf. Schwartz, supra note 38, at 438 (describing elements of paternalism in CLS
scholarship).
69 Cf. M. Shapiro & R. Spece, Bioethics and Law: Cases, Materials and Problems
168-73 (1980) (terms like "ill" taken as justifying nonconsensual treatment of those so
inflicted, when such treatment would otherwise be intolerable).
70 See Brosnan, supra note 3, at 264-68 (CLS politically passive, concentrates on
doctrinal and conceptual manipulation at the expense of developing a theory ofjustice).
See also Johnson, supra note 53, at 281-83 (program for action hazy and platitudinous);
but see D. Kennedy, supra note 7 (proposing concrete reforms to law school structure
and operation); Gabel & Harris, Building Power & Breaking Images, 11 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change 369 (1982) (urging revolutionary legal activism); Sparer, supra note
1, at 565-73 (urging progressive social action).
71 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (CLS criticizes free speech as an
ephemeral right).
7 See Sparer, supra note 1, at 565-71; Schwartz, supra note 38, at 426-28 (theo-
retical utopianism); id. at 448-52 (grotesque and irresponsible proposals).
73 See Brest, supra note 38, at 1109; Gabel, supra note 37, at 45-46; Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, supra note 14, at 1771.
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cisionmaking would be decentralized; rules would be set by
small groups such as factory workers, farm workers, and stu-
dents, 74 and would remain subject to constant renegotiation. 75
Hierarchy would not exist; everyone would be equal.76 There
would be no need for rights-at least not so many as we rec-
ognize today. Instead, everyone would share work, goods and
responsibilities. 77
Individuals would benefit from the de-emphasis on individ-
ualism in Utopia. In contemporary society, the individual lacks
depth and character because of his isolation and lack of com-
mitment to others. 7 He may be free in a formal sense, but he
is also stunted and barely human. In a non-hierarchical, non-
repressive society, on the other hand, the human personality
would flourish.
79
The Crits' positive program would poorly serve the needs
of minorities. Some radical theoreticians may indeed be lonely.
Most minority lawyers and law professors are not: we have each
other. We meet, share experiences, recount horror stories, laugh
and cry together. Victimization brings us together, building in
us a community. It is much more problematic to accept the
invitation, if it is that, to join Crits and other whites in mixed-
race communities lacking in structure or rules.
Two immediate difficulties confront any serious discussion
of incorporating minorities into the utopian communities envi-
sioned by the Crits. First, one must be a self who is fully
recognized as a member of a community of selves before one
can merge into such a community, and certainly before the lines
between self and others can safely begin to blur. How can this
74 See Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 1, at 230.
75 Id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 53, at 1771.
76 See, e.g., Klare, supra note 7 (equality in the workplace); Simon, The Ideology
of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 133
(1978) (equality of lawyer and client).
'n See Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 Md. L. Rev. 695 (1982) (shared risks
among workers and managers); Gabel, Book Review, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 302, 315 (1977)
(shared selves-merging of sense of self with sense of others so as to blur lines among
persons); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, supra note 14,
at 1771.
78 See Gabel and Kennedy, supra note 53, at 46; cf. C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice
173 (1983) (identifying in women a morality of connectedness). See generally Bush,
supra note 34.
79 See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, supra note 4, at 579-85. See
generally Bush, supra note 34.
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happen unless society first recognizes us as coequal members,
something it has yet to do?
80
Second, there are no guarantees that racism would not
resurface in the CLS communities. To date, Crits have not
articulated a psychological or political theory of the origin of
racism or of how it could be eradicated. If racism were to surface
in a CLS-style Utopia, there would be no rules, rights, federal
statutes, or even courts to counteract it. Even if there were
tribunals or people's commissions of some kind, would they be
guided by strict scrutiny1 in examining cases of prejudice? Prob-
ably not, since the once-oppressed and politically powerless
groups would presumably have been empowered by the egali-
tarian Utopia. Perhaps these difficulties could be overcome. In
the meantime, however, the costs of moving to a utopian society
would be borne by minorities, since the dismantling of formal
structures would initially lead to an increase in racist behavior s2
Ostensibly, the CLS choice of structure for the post-revo-
lutionary community is neutral and based on those arrangements
with the greatest potential for humanity. However, that choice
'is not value-free. Utopian society would empower whites, giving
them satisfaction currently denied,83 and disempower minorities,
making life even less secure than it is today. As a black leader
is supposed to have said, "Community don't look like me."
II. Informality-The Source of the Trouble
Much of the misfit between the CLS program and the as-
pirations of minorities is due to the informality of the CLS
program.8 4 CLS themes and approaches criticize formal struc-
80 On the difficulty of achieving selfhood in a racist society, see, e.g., G. Alport,
supra note 24, at 142-62; W. Grier & P. Cobbs, Black Rage (1968).
11 Inability of a group to fend for itself in the political marketplace is a principal
justification for applying strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause to state action.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972); cf. United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
8Cf. D. Bell, supra note 29, at 29-30, 40-46 (costs of racial remedies always placed
on blacks or poor whites); Bell, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial
Remedies, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 3 (1979).
0 See G. Torres, supra note 23.
84 For a discussion of formalism and nonformalism in the context of adjudicatory
processes, see Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Min-
imizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359
(1985).
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tures such as rights, rules and bureaucracies, while opting for
consciously informal processes that rely on good will, intersub-
jective understanding and community. The CLS positive and
negative programs exemplify this informality; they illustrate the
Crits' preference for holistic approaches that sweep everything
at once into their scope.85
Whatever sense informal, small-scale politics may make for
the CLS membership, it is bad news for minorities. Discretion-
ary judgments colored by racism or other forms of prejudice are
made possible by replacing rules, guidelines and rights with
fluid, informal decisionmaking. In fact, structureless processes
affirmatively increase the likelihood of prejudice. CLS theorists
have avoided confronting these risks, since CLS lacks a political
and psychological theory of racism. CLS theory simply assumes
that racism is just another form of class-based oppression, a
product of a hierarchal social structure.8 6
The Crits' focus on informality also ignores the influence
that rules have on an individual's character and action. A society
that enacts rules and provides structures to curb racism an-
nounces that racism is unacceptable behavior. By committing
ourselves to norms of fairness we become fairer people. By
changing the structure, we change the setting in which we act
and ultimately change ourselves. If we jettison rules and struc-
tures, we risk losing the gains we have made in combatting
racism.
The psychological-political analysis that follows explains
and illustrates the interaction among rules, conduct and char-
acter. I outline the principal social scientific theories of racism
and then develop a consensus position which explains the cir-
cumstances in which most people are likely to behave in a
discriminatory fashion. I apply this view to the highly informal
Crit program to demonstrate that the CLS program exposes
minorities to an increased risk of prejudicial treatment.
8 See, e.g., supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text (rejection of rights in favor
of principles, shared love and cooperation); supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text
(rejection of incremental reform; insistence on global change).
16I was unable to locate any CLS articles or books on the psychology of racism.
The relatively few treatments of race discuss it in political or class terms. See, e.g.,
Freeman, supra note 16; Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 1, at 227-36 (utopian
proposals center almost exclusively on reforming social arrangements to eliminate hi-
erarchy, lessen alienation, and increase community and sharing); cf. Pettigrew, supra
note 50, at 685-86 (current theorists tend to confuse race problems with class struggle).
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A. Theories of Race and Racism
Most Americans harbor some degree of racial prejudice.
7
Indeed, individuals rarely come to grips with their racist impul-
ses and bring them completely under control.8 8 Most deal with
them through a variety of mechanisms: displacement, denial,
rationalization, overcompensation and compromise.8 9
Social scientists have developed a number of overlapping
theories to explain the origin of prejudice based on race, eth-
nicity, sex, or other immutable characteristics." The principal
approaches are: psychoanalytic theories, which explain preju-
dice in terms of unconscious forces and deep-seated syndromes,
such as the authoritarian personality;9' socioeconomic theories,
which explain prejudice through historical trends, social group
clashes and scapegoating; 92 and social-psychological theories,
which explain racism by means of social conditioning and in-
group/out-group categories. 93 It is likely that each of these the-
ories partly explains the multifaceted aspects of racist behavior.
" See Is the Dream Over?, Newsweek on Campus, Feb. 1987, at 10, 12 (black
students "treated like aliens"; "[t]ales of insults abound"); Friedrich, Racism on the
Rise, Time, Feb. 2, 1987, at 18, 21 (survey of attitudes); Racism Flares on Campus,
Time, Dec. 8, 1980, at 28 (changes in national mood; prejudice now considered "ac-
ceptable" in some quarters); Less Tolerance for Cults, Broad Pattern of Prejudice
Revealed, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 9, 1987, at 4, col. 3 (reporting results of Gallup
poll).
For classic studies of the nature and extent of ethnic prejudice among Americans,
see G. Allport, supra note 24, at 79-80, 197-202. For a recent study of the more subtle
forms of prejudice, see generally Pettigrew, supra note 50.
8 See G. Allport, supra note 24, at 338; I. Katz, Stigma-A Social Psychological
Analysis 97 (1981); Pettigrew, supra note 50, at 688-89 (many avoid outward expressions
of racism, but without internalizing norms against it).
9 See Delgado, supra note 84, at 1384 (discussing the principal psychological meth-
ods by which individuals deal with tension between racist impulses and public norms
condemning racism); Pettigrew, supra note 50, at 690 (discussing avoidance and dis-
placement mechanisms).
90 Some of these theories are summarized in Delgado, supra note 84, at 1375-83.
See generally P. van den Berghe, supra note 24.
91 For an excellent summary of psychoanalytic theories of racism, see Lawrence,
The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan.
L. Rev. 317, 331-36 (1987); see also G. Allport, supra note 24, at 199; T. Adorno, E.
Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson & R. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (1950);
Simpson & Yinger, The Personality Functions of Prejudice and Discrimination, in Racial
and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination (G. Simpson & J.
Yinger 4th ed. 1972).
92 See G. Allport, supra note 24, at 224-25 (historical scapegoating); id. at 234-38
(unconscious use of racism and scapegoating to maintain group loyalty); J. Kovel, White
Racism-A Psychohistory 44 (1984) (psychology of a people a product of historical
forces); Delgado, supra note 84, at 1378-79; see also Handlin, Prejudice and Capitalist
Exploitation, 6 Commentary 79 (1948) (psychological explanation of racism incomplete;
explanation must reach out to include social forces).
91 See G. Allport, supra note 24, at 22, 29-47, 139; K. Clark, Prejudice and Your
Child 17 (2d ed. 1963); J. Kovel, supra note 92, at 132. See generally Snyder, On the
1987] Minority Critique. of CLS: The Ethereal Scholar 317
On the other hand, racism runs counter to the body of
public principles that form our national ethos, including fairness,
egalitarianism and humanitarianism. 94 The conflict between ra-
cist impulses and the American creed causes many people to
act inconsistently-fairly and humanely on one occasion,
thoughtlessly or with prejudice on another.95 Racism and racial
egalitarianism are thus maintained in equipoise. Americans are
influenced by both public and private norms with respect to
race. 96 The highly principled public norm exhorts us to treat
others in an unprejudiced, evenhanded fashion. 97 The private
norms, the standards that guide us during moments of intimacy
or familiarity, are much less noble. 98 In private settings, preju-
dicial behavior and speech are much more likely to appear. The
same individual may thus act quite differently on different oc-
casions, depending on whether he sees himself as governed by
public or private values.
The "situational specificity" 99 of the racist impulse supplies
the best means for its control. Most people suppress their prej-
udices when environmental features remind them that racism
will not be tolerated and that the American creed demands a
high standard of conduct. Although there are other theories and
approaches to racism,100 the "confrontation" approach-where
prejudice is publicly confronted and discouraged through formal
Self Perpetuating Nature of Social Stereotypes, in Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping
and Intergroup Behavior 183 (D. Hamilton ed. 1981); Delgado, supra note 84, at 1380
(summarizing social-psychological theories of prejudices).
94 For the classic statement of this view, see G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma:
The Negro Problem and Modem Democracy (1962).
9- See I. Katz, supra note 88, at 23; P. van den Berghe, supra note 24, at 20-21;
Delgado, supra note 84, at 1384-85; Fairchild & Gurin, Traditions in the Social-Psy-
chological Analysis of Race Relations, 21 Am. Behav. 757, 764 (1978).
96 See G. Myrdal, supra note 94, at LXXI, 80.
97Id.
98 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
99 See I. Katz, supra note 88, at 23; 1. Kovel, supra note 92, at 54-55; Fairchild &
Gurin, supra note 95, at 764.
100 The leading contender is the "social contact" theory, which supports much of
the push for social integration through, for example, school desegregation. This theory
argues that prejudice arises from the individual's mistaken belief that minority group
members hold beliefs and values different from one's own. Consequently, the belief
may be dispelled through demonstration, via close contact, that it is erroneous. Ac-
cording to the social contact theorists, however, not all kinds of contact reduce discrim-
ination. The contact must be among individuals of equal status and sanctioned by social
supports, such as law and custom. See G. Allport, supra note 24, at 261-81; Delgado,
supra note 84, at 1382, 1385-86; Simpson & Yinger, The Reeducation of Prejudice and
Discrimination: Changing the Prejudiced Person, in Racial and Cultural Minorities: An
Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination, supra note 91, at 673.
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structures-is the most widely accepted means of controlling
prejudice in the legal and political literature. 1 1 The theory is
supported by empirical studies of legal decisionmaking, includ-
ing reviews of alternative dispute resolution and comparisons
between the adversarial and inquisitorial modes of presenting
evidence. 102
Little of this will surprise minority readers. We know by a
kind of instinct that there are times when our white friends can
be trusted and times when they cannot. We know that there are
occasions-when the flag is flying, the bands are playing, and
public values are foremost in everyone's minds-when we are
comparatively safe, and that there are other occasions when we
must be careful.
The bottom line is that formal public settings are relatively
safe for minorities, while informal private settings present risks.
To minimize racism, one should structure settings so that public
norms are enforced, and prejudice openly confronted and dis-
couraged. Society should avoid creating intimate, unguided set-
tings where highly charged interracial encounters can take place.
It remains to be considered what the confrontation theory, and
the formality/informality axis generated by that theory, implies
for the CLS program.
B. Applying the Theory of Race to the CLS Program
The confrontation theory helps to explain why the open-
ended features of the CLS program worry minority scholars.
For example, the CLS positive program, which calls for small
communities that function without written agendas, statutes,
rules or rights, 13 would allow for discretionary judgments based
on racial prejudice, and contain few of the structural features
that confront and check racism. The lack of confrontation mech-
101 See, e.g., I. Katz, supra note 88, at 16, 109. See generally Delgado, supra note
84, at 1385-87.
102 See generally Lind, Thibaut and Walker, A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the
Effect of Adversary and Inquisitorial Process on Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 62 Va.
L. Rev. 271 (1976); Mnookin and Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979); Nader, Disputing Without the Force of
Law, 88 Yale L.J. 998 (1979); Thibaut and Walker, Discovery and Presentation of
Evidence in Adversary and Non-Adversary Proceedings, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1973);
Thibaut, Walker, LaTour and Houlden, Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 Stan. L.
Rev. 1271 (1974); Thibaut, Walker and Lind, Adversary Presentation & Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 386 (1972).
103 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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anisms would likely ensure the invasion of racism into the
community.
CLS scholars' rejection of incrementalism also illustrates
the dangers of informality. By insisting that everything must
change at once, CLS rejects the slow, painstaking process of
establishing and refining precedent, replacing that relatively for-
mal process with a mercurial vision of social change with no
clear direction and undefined ends.
Similar considerations hold true, although not quite so
strongly, for CLS scholars' idealism and their use of the concept
of false consciousness. The Crits' emphasis on mental con-
structs reveals their preference for free-form change over the
concrete reform accomplished by litigation, labor activism and
community organizing. CLS prefers the broad reach of thought
to the measured progression that occurs through new jobs, bet-
ter housing, court victories and school desegregation.
C. The Laboratory of Daily Life: Applying the Theory of Race
to the CLS Organization and Its Mode of Operation
Theories, according to pragmatic philosophy, must be
tested by their consequences, and by the ways in which they
modify the behavior of their adherents.'04 Thus, one should
examine the organizational and personal behavior of the mem-
bers of the Critical Legal Studies Conference on matters of race
in order to determine the possible impact of their theories on
minorities, particularly since many members of the Conference
believe in the inseparability of politics and daily life. 10 5 If the
Conference's reform program holds promise for minorities, one
should find a heightened racial sensitivity among the organiza-
tion and its members.
An examination of the Conference on racial matters does
not yield a clear-cut answer to the question. The organization,
as is predictable from its theories and program, is highly infor-
mal. There are no bylaws, elections, procedures, officers, mem-
bership cards or committees. 106 Annual meetings and summer
104 See W. James, Pragmatism, and Four Essays From the Meaning of Truth 133
(1975); see generally C. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in The Philosophy of
Peirce: Selected Writings 23 (J. Buchler ed. 1940).
105 See, e.g., Boyle, Critical Legal Studies: A Young Person's Guide 18 (1983)
(unpublished manuscript on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review).
106 Id. at 20.
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workshops are organized by ad hoc groups who decide that they
have something to say. The informality of the structure allows
the "white male heavies," most of whom are at Harvard, to
wield a disproportionate amount of power. 10 7 Few women or
minorities wield signficant influence.
0 8
The record of individual members of the Conference is
better than that of the organization itself. At least three of its
well-known members wrote powerful and influential articles
supporting minority causes. 0 9 Many Crits welcome minority
colleagues on their faculties, and support affirmative action in
law school admissions and appointments." 0 Yet few Crits took
an active role in the aftermath of an incident in which the
competence of a leading black scholar was challenged by stu-
dents and colleagues."' In addition, there have been sporadic
reports of racist language and stereotyping in Crits' scholar-
ship,1 2 and of rude treatment of minority panelists by Crits." 3
One would conclude that the Conference's record on racial
justice matters is good, but not outstanding-perhaps 3.4 on a
4.0 point scale. If racism manifests itself among CLS members,
it is frightening to imagine what would occur in a similarly
unstructured group with a less progressively-minded mem-
bership.
III. Beyond CLS-Toward a Radical Minority Social-Legal
Agenda
It is axiomatic that any social reform program that minori-
ties would find appealing would be based on the express need
for understanding and coping with racism. It is not enough to
207 Id. at 18-28.
109 Id. at 28.
209 Brest, The Federal Government's Power to Protect Negroes and Civil Rights
Workers Against Privately Inflicted Harm, Part I, 1 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 2 (1966);
Brest, The Federal Government's Power to Protect Negroes and Civil Rights Workers
Against Privately oiflicted Harm, Part 11, 2 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1966); Freeman,
supra note 16; Klare, supra note 17; see also Sparer, supra note 1.
110 Boyle, supra note.105, at 18.
MI See Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspective, Stan. L. Sch. J., Apr., 1986,
at 1, col. 1.
112 See J. Bracamonte, R. Delgado & G. Torres, Statement at the Minority Critique
Panel, Critical Legal Studies Annual Meeting (Jan. 1987) (unpublished manuscript on
file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review).
123 See N. Gotanda, Statement at the Critical Legal Studies Annual Meeting (Jan.
1987) (on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review) (describing treat-
ment of minority panelists at an earlier meeting).
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subsume racism under some other category, such as class strug-
gle, that fails to understand racism's subtlety and complexity.
The program should incorporate some variant of the confron-
tation approach to containing racism. 1 4 The new society, and
its transitional predecessor, would create structures for detect-
ing and punishing racism and for reminding community members
that such conduct will not be tolerated. Because of these struc-
tures, such a society would be relatively formal.
Any society consciously designed to promote minority well-
being must initially include a strong central authority founded
on a healthy skepticism both of human nature and of the pos-
sibilities of change through appeals to idealism. Tempering ro-
manticism with watchfulness, it would instead effect change
through appeals to citizens' self-interest by arguing that power
and resource realignments benefit everyone.
1 15
The need for centralized authority stems from the necessity
for counter-coercive measures on behalf of minorities. One can-
not rely on local authority to redistribute power and physical
resources because it is too close to the community and unlikely
to upset the status quo. The further authority is from the com-
munity, the better.
Our principal worry is not the abuse of corporate or bu-
reaucratic power (CLS' foe), but rather the simple next-door,
one-on-one microaggressions by whites." 6 It is a sad truth that,
even today, many minorities find success and relative relief from
racism only in highly structured, rule-bound environments such
as the Army." 7 Group membership may force Crits and other
majority-group members to reflect on politics and the nature of
the common good, but unless such reflection is accompanied by
formal barriers against racism, it is meaningless.
Conclusion
This article asked what minorities would like to see in a
legal and political theory, and whether the CLS program
114 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
"5 Cf. Bell, supra note 82, at 17 (whites permit social remedies only when these
coincide with their self-interest).
1
6 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
117 Blacks and other minorities have often found professional advancement in the
relatively formal environment of the armed forces. See Moskos, Success Story: Blacks
in the Army, Atlantic Monthly, May 1986, at 64.
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matches that vision. The answer is that CLS does not provide
what minorities seek.
Although some of the features of the CLS program are
attractive to minorities, others increase our vulnerability to op-
pressive or degrading treatment by the majority. A number of
these difficulties arise from CLS scholars' ironic failure to artic-
ulate a satisfactory theory of either the genesis or the treatment
of racism.
The views of various scholars on racism coalesce to form
a "confrontation theory," which describes the best means of
confining and combatting racism. Many of the intuitive reser-
vations and fears minorities have about the Crits' program arise
from the Crits' desire to eliminate those formal societal struc-
tures which, according to the confrontation theory, are needed
to curb racist impulses in society. In contrast, the radical social
reform program outlined here can provide minorities the pro-
tection and security they need to function in a world dominated
by persons of a race and heritage different from their own.
This reform program may be a tall order, but it is no taller
than the CLS vision of an informal Utopia. Indeed, compared
to the Crits' proposed society, it is a great deal more humane,
safe and protective for those of us who have been denied hu-
manity, safety and protection for so long.
